by sfab358 | Aug 5, 2019
Speaker: Arkadii Slinko (University of Auckland)
Paper to be presented: “Secret Sharing and Prisonner’s Dilemma” joint with Yvo Desmedt (University of Texas at Dallas)
Date, Time and Venue: Wednesday, 21 August 2019, 15:00-16:00, 260-5115 [Business School Building, Level 5]
Abstract: The study of Rational Secret Sharing initiated by Halpern and Teague (2004) regards the reconstruction of the secret in secret sharing as a game. It was shown that participants (parties) may refuse to reveal their shares and so the reconstruction may fail. Moreover, a refusal to reveal the share may be a dominant strategy of a party. In this paper we consider secret sharing as a sub-action or subgame of a larger action/game where the secret opens a possibility of consumption of a certain common good. We claim that utilities of participants will be dependent on the nature of this common good. In particular, Halpern and Teague (2014)’s scenario corresponds to a rivalrous and excludable common good. We consider the case when this common good is non-rivalrous and non-excludable and many natural Nash equilibria. We list several applications of secret sharing to demonstrate our claim and give corresponding scenarios. In such circumstances the secret sharing scheme facilitates a power sharing agreement in the society. We also state that non-reconstruction may be beneficial for this society and give several examples.
Everyone Welcome!
by sfab358 | Jul 31, 2019
Speaker: David Kelsey (University of Exeter)
Paper to be presented: “Tort Liability and Unawareness” joint with Surajeet Chakravarty (Exeter University, UK) and Joshua Teitelbaum (Georgetown University, USA)
Date, Time and Venue: Wednesday, 14 August 2019, 15:00-16:00, 260-5115 [Business School Building, Level 5]
Abstract: Unawareness is a form of bounded rationality where a person fails to conceive all feasible acts or consequences or to perceive as feasible all conceivable act-consequence links. We study the implications of unawareness for tort law, where relevant examples include the discovery of a new product or technology (new act), of a new disease or injury (new consequence), or that a product can cause an injury (new link). We argue that negligence has an important advantage over strict liability in a world with unawareness-negligence, through the stipulation of due care standards, spreads awareness about the updated probability of harm.
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by sfab358 | May 24, 2019
Speaker: Michael Gordon (PhD Candidate, Massey University)
Paper to be presented: “Can we predict outcomes of systematic replication studies? Decision Markets Part 2 – Real World Applications”
Date, Time and Venue: Monday, 27 May 2019, 14:00-15:00, 260-6115 [Business School Building, Level 6]
Abstract: The credibility of scientific findings is of fundamental importance to enhance future research. One potential approach of collecting information about this credibility is to elicit beliefs about the reproducibility of scientific claims among scientists. Four studies have recently used surveys and prediction markets to estimate beliefs about replication in systematic large scale replication projects, but the sample size in each study has been small. Here we pool data for the four studies (n = 104) to assess the performance of surveys and prediction markets. This dataset and subsequent analysis allow us to comment on the real world success of prediction markets in terms of eliciting and aggregating information.
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by sfab358 | May 10, 2019
Speaker: Thomas Pfeiffer (NZIAS, Massey University)
Paper to be presented: “Predict to decide: An Introduction to decision markets”
Date, Time and Venue: Monday, 20 May 2019, 14:00-15:00, 260-6115 [Business School Building, Level 6]
Abstract: Prediction markets are popular tools to “crowd-source” distributed information and aggregate it into forecasts. Such forecasts can be very valuable for decision makers. Commercial companies, for instance, can benefit from accurate forecasts regarding the future demand for their products. Many decision-making problems, however, require conditional forecasts. To decide, for instance, between alternative marketing campaigns, a company needs to understand how each of the alternatives will affect sales. Finding mechanisms that properly incentivise participants to provide their information for such conditional forecasts is non-trivial, but can be done through so-called decision markets. I will kick off a mini-series on decision markets by describing how they work and giving an overview of our research activities on this topic.
Everyone Welcome!
by sfab358 | Apr 15, 2019
Speaker: Matthew Ryan (AUT)
Paper to be presented: “Rationalising Random Choice as Random Consideration”
Date, Time and Venue: Monday, 13 May 2019, 14:00-15:00, 260-6115 [Business School Building, Level 6]
Abstract: Attempts to rationalise experimental evidence of pervasive randomness in choice behaviour may be divided into four categories: (i) models of deliberate randomisation; (ii) models of noisy utility maximisation (bounded rationality); (iii) random preferences models; and (iv) random consideration models. Category (i) has largely been explored by economists; (ii) and (iii) are mainly associated with mathematical psychologists and (iv) with researchers in marketing science. Recently, economists have taken an increasing interest in (iv), following the pioneering work of Manzini and Mariotti (Econometrica, 2014). This talk will briefly introduce random consideration models and their relationships with random preference models. A new random consideration model will also be proposed and “axiomatised”. This new model allows preferences to be ill-behaved on subsets of alternatives that are never considered together. In other words, the model is predicated on the implicit (and hopefully plausible) assumption that consideration is necessary to discipline preference.
Everyone Welcome!
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