Two CMSS seminars: Nina Anchugina & Arkadii Slinko

by dion | Apr 30, 2015

Speaker: Nina Anchugina & Arkadii Slinko
Affiliation: The University of Auckland
Title: Two talks see titles below
Date: Thursday, 7 May 2015
Time: 5:00 pm
Location: Room 260-325, Owen Glenn Building

1. Speaker: Nina Anchugina.
Title: A simple framework for the axiomatization of exponential and quasi-hyperbolic discounting
Time: 30 min.

Abstract: The main goal of this talk is to investigate which normative requirements, or axioms, lead to exponential and quasi-hyperbolic forms of discounting in inter-temporal decision-making. Exponential discounting has a well-established axiomatic foundation originally developed by Koopmans (1960) with subsequent contributions by several other authors. Hayashi (2003) and Olea and Strzalecki (2014) axiomatize quasi-hyperbolic discounting. In this talk we provide an alternative foundation for exponential and quasi-hyperbolic discounting, with simple, transparent axioms and relatively straightforward proofs. Using techniques by Fishburn (1982) and Harvey (1986), we show that Anscombe and Aumann’s (1963) version of Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) theory can be readily adapted to axiomatize the aforementioned types of discounting, in both finite and infinite horizon settings.

This is a joint work with Matthew Ryan.

2. Speaker: Arkadii Slinko
Title: Condorcet Domains and Median Graphs
Time 30 min

Abstract: A set of linear orders D is called a Condorcet domain if every profile composed from preferences from D has acyclic majority relation. Maximal Condorcet domains have been a subject of intense investigation, especially by Fishburn and Monjardet. Demange (2012) generalized the classical single-crossing property to the intermediate property on median graphs and proved that for every intermediate profile R with an odd number of voters on a median graph G there is a representative voter whose preference order coincides with the majority relation. We complement her result with proving that the linear orders of any profile which is intermediate on a median graph form a Condorcet domain. We prove that for any median graph there exists a profile that is intermediate with respect to that graph and that one may need at least as many alternatives as vertices to construct such a profile. We provide a polynomial-time algorithm to recognise whether or not a given profile is intermediate with respect to some median graph.

This is a joint work with Adam Clearwater (The University of Auckland) and Clemens Puppe (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany).

Everyone welcome!

Video available: Valery Pavlov – Non-transitive Games in Business

by dion | Mar 27, 2015

The video from the seminar “Non-transitive Games in Business” by Valery Pavlov is now available on the CMSS YouTube channel.

CMSS Seminar: Valery Pavlov

by dion | Mar 20, 2015

Speaker: Valery Pavlov
Affiliation: Information Systems and Operations Management
Title: Non-transitive games in business
Date: Tuesday, 24 Mar 2015
Time: 5:00 pm
Location: Owen Glen building, room 260-321

This paper studies a model of competition between two players who are concerned not only with their expected profits but also with their chance of earning more than the other player. As a result, the game has some similarities with the well-known Rock-Paper-Scissors game. We conduct an experiment that tests (i) the hypothesis that such competition may arise without monetary rewards, purely as a result of intrinsic competitiveness and (ii) whether such social preferences can be easily mitigated. The experimental data provide strong evidence of the intrinsic competitiveness hypothesis and indicate some possibilities for its mitigation.
We hope this study may be of interest for practicing managers. First, it broadly captures a number of common situations in which “popular” decisions clash with “good” ones. Popular decisions bring pleasing results more often than good decisions but the difference in such is not that big whereas when outcomes of good decisions result in much higher gains albeit less often. Second, the competition mechanism we analyzed may explain why employees may be reluctant to share their own decisions and when decisions of the best employees are shared with the rest the overall performance of the company may be driven away from the optimum.

Everyone welcome!